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Abstract
The information-theoretic point of view proposed by Leibniz in
1686 and developed by algorithmic information theory (AIT) suggests
that mathematics and physics are not that different. This will be a
first-person account of some doubts and speculations about the nature
of mathematics that I have entertained for the past three decades, and
which have now been incorporated in a digital philosophy paradigm
shift that is sweeping across the sciences.
1. What is algorithmic information theory?
The starting point for my own work on AIT forty years ago was the insight
that a scientific theory is a computer program that calculates the observa-
tions, and that the smaller the program is, the better the theory. If there
is no theory, that is to say, no program substantially smaller than the data
itself, considering them both to be finite binary strings, then the observations
are algorithmically random, theory-less, unstructured, incomprehensible and
irreducible.
theory = program −→ Computer −→ output = experimental data
So this led me to a theory of randomness based on program-size com-
plexity [1], whose main application turned out to be not in science, but in
mathematics, more specifically, in meta-mathematics, where it yields power-
ful new information-theoretic versions of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [2,
3, 4]. (I’ll discuss this in Section 3.)
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And from this new information-theoretic point of view, math and physics
do not seem too different. In both cases understanding is compression, and
is measured by the extent to which empirical data and mathematical theo-
rems are respectively compressed into concise physical laws or mathematical
axioms, both of which are embodied in computer software [5].
And why should one use reasoning at all in mathematics?! Why not pro-
ceed entirely empirically, more or less as physicists do? Well, the advantange
of proving things is that assuming a few bits of axioms is less risky than
assuming many empirically-suggested mathematical assertions. (The disad-
vantage, of course, is the length of the proofs and the risk of faulty proofs.)
Each bit in an irreducible axiom of a mathematical theory is a freely-chosen
independent assumption, with an a priori probability of half of being the
right choice, so one wants to reduce the number of such independent choices
to a minimum in creating a new theory.
So this point of view would seem to suggest that while math and physics
are admittedly different, perhaps they are not as different as most people
usually believe. Perhaps we should feel free to pursue not only rigorous,
formal modern proofs, but also the swash-buckling experimental math that
Euler enjoyed so much. And in fact theoretical computer scientists have to
some extent already done this, since their P 6= NP hypothesis is probably
currently the best candidate for canonization as a new axiom. And, as is
suggested in [6], another possible candidate is the Riemann hypothesis.
But before discussing this in more detail, I’d like to tell how I discovered
that in 1686 Leibniz anticipated some of the basic ideas of AIT.
2. How Leibniz almost invented algorithmic
information theory [7]
One day last year, while preparing my first philosophy paper [5], for a philos-
ophy congress in Bonn, I was reading a little book on philosophy by Hermann
Weyl that was published in 1932, and I was amazed to find the following,
which captures the essential idea of my definition of algorithmic randomness:
“The assertion that nature is governed by strict laws is devoid
of all content if we do not add the statement that it is gov-
erned by mathematically simple laws. . . That the notion of law
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becomes empty when an arbitrary complication is per-
mitted was already pointed out by Leibniz in his Metaphysical
Treatise [Discourse on Metaphysics ]. Thus simplicity becomes a
working principle in the natural sciences.
—Weyl [8, pp. 40–42]. See a similar discussion on pp. 190–191 of
Weyl [9], Section 23A, “Causality and Law”.
In fact, I actually read Weyl [9] as a teenager, before inventing AIT at
age 15, but the matter is not stated so sharply there. And a few years ago
I stumbled on the above-quoted text in Weyl [8], but hadn’t had the time
to pursue it until stimulated to do so by an invitation from the German
Philosophy Association to talk at their 2002 annual congress, that happened
to be on limits and how to transcend them.
So I got a hold of Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics to see what he
actually said. Here it is:
“As for the simplicity of the ways of God, this holds properly
with respect to his means, as opposed to the variety, richness,
and abundance, which holds with respect to his ends or effects.”
“. . . not only does nothing completely irregular occur in the world,
but we would not even be able to imagine such a thing. Thus,
let us assume, for example, that someone jots down a number of
points at random on a piece of paper, as do those who practice
the ridiculous art of geomancy.1 I maintain that it is possible
to find a geometric line whose [m]otion is constant and uniform,
following a certain rule, such that this line passes through all the
points in the same order in which the hand jotted them down.”
“But, when a rule is extremely complex, what is in con-
formity with it passes for irregular. Thus, one can say, in
whatever manner God might have created the world, it would al-
ways have been regular and in accordance with a certain general
order. But God has chosen the most perfect world, that
is, the one which is at the same time the simplest in hy-
potheses and the richest in phenomena, as might be a line
in geometry whose construction is easy and whose properties and
effects are extremely remarkable and widespread.”
1[A way to foretell the future; a form of divination.]
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—Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686, Sections 5–6, as trans-
lated by Ariew and Garber [10, pp. 38–39].
ideas = input −→ Mind of God −→ output = the universe
And after finishing my paper [5] for the Bonn philosophy congress, I
learned that Leibniz’s original Discourse on Metaphysics was in French,
which I know, and fortunately not in Latin, which I don’t know, and that it
was readily available from France:
“Pour ce qui est de la simplicite´ des voyes de Dieu, elle a lieu
proprement a` l’e´gard des moyens, comme au contraire la variete´,
richesse ou abondance y a lieu a` l’e´gard des fins ou effects.”
“. . . non seulement rien n’arrive dans le monde, qui soit absolu-
ment irregulier, mais on ne sc¸auroit meˆmes rien feindre de tel. Car
supposons par exemple que quelcun fasse quantite´ de points sur le
papier a` tout hazard, comme font ceux qui exercent l’art ridicule
de la Geomance, je dis qu’il est possible de trouver une ligne ge-
ometrique dont la [m]otion soit constante et uniforme suivant une
certaine regle, en sorte que cette ligne passe par tous ces points,
et dans le meˆme ordre que la main les avoit marque´s.”
“Mais quand une regle est fort compose´e, ce qui luy est
conforme, passe pour irre´gulier. Ainsi on peut dire que de
quelque maniere que Dieu auroit cre´e´ le monde, il auroit tousjours
este´ regulier et dans un certain ordre general. MaisDieu a choisi
celuy qui est le plus parfait, c’est a` dire celuy qui est en meˆme
temps le plus simple en hypotheses et le plus riche en
phenomenes, comme pourroit estre une ligne de Geometrie dont
la construction seroit aise´e et les propriete´s et effects seroient fort
admirables et d’une grande e´tendue.”
—Leibniz, Discours de me´taphysique, V–VI [11, pp. 40–41].
(Here “dont la motion” is my correction. The Gallimard text [11] states
“dont la notion,” an obvious misprint, which I’ve also corrected in the English
translation by Ariew and Garber.)
So, in summary, Leibniz observes that for any finite set of points there
is a mathematical formula that produces a curve that goes through them
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all, and it can be parametrized so that it passes through the points in the
order that they were given and with a constant speed. So this cannot give
us a definition of what it means for a set of points to obey a law. But if the
formula is very simple, and the data is very complex, then that’s a real law !
Recall that Leibniz was at the beginning of the modern era, in which
ancient metaphysics was colliding with modern empirical science. And he
was a great mathematician as well as a philosopher. So here he is able to
take a stab at clarifying what it means to say that Nature is lawful and what
are the conditions for empirical science to be possible.
AIT puts more meat on Leibniz’s proposal, it makes his ideas more precise
by giving a precise definition of complexity.
And AIT goes beyond Leibniz by using program-size complexity to clarify
what it means for a sequence of observations to be lawless, one which has
no theory, and by applying this to studying the limits of formal axiomatic
reasoning, i.e., what can be achieved by mindlessly and mechanically grinding
away deducing all possible consequences of a fixed set of axioms. (I’ll say
more about metamathematical applications of AIT in Section 3 below.)
axioms = program −→ Computer −→ output = theorems
By the way, the articles by philosophy professors that I’ve seen that dis-
cuss the above text by Leibniz criticize what they see as the confused and
ambiguous nature of his remarks. On the contrary, I admire his prescience
and the manner in which he has unerringly identified the central issue, the
key idea. He even built a mechanical calculator and with his speculations
regarding a Characteristica Universalis (“Adamic” language of creation) en-
visioned something that Martin Davis [12] has argued was a direct intellectual
ancestor of the universal Turing machine, which is precisely the device that
is needed in order for AIT to be able to quantify Leibniz’s original insight!
Davis quotes some interesting remarks by Leibniz about the practical
utility of his calculating machine. Here is part of the Davis Leibniz quote:
“And now that we may give final praise to the machine we may
say that it will be desirable to all who are engaged in compu-
tations which, it is well known, are the managers of financial
affairs, the administrators of others’ estates, merchants, survey-
ors, geographers, navigators, astronomers. . . For it is unworthy of
excellent men to lose hours like slaves in the labor of calculations
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which could safely be relegated to anyone else if the machine were
used.”
This reminds me of a transcript of a lecture that von Neumann gave at
the inauguration of the NORC (Naval Ordnance Computer) that I read many
years ago. It attempted to convince people that computers were of value. It
was a hard sell! The obvious practical and scientific utility of calculators and
computers, though it was evident to Leibniz, Babbage and von Neumann,
was far from evident to most people. Even von Neumann’s colleagues at the
Princeton Institute of Advanced Study completely failed to understand this
(see Casti [13]).
And I am almost forgetting something important that I read in E. T. Bell
[14] as a child, which is that Leibniz invented base-two binary notation
for integers. Bell reports that this was a result of Leibniz’s interest in Chinese
culture; no doubt he got it from the I Ching. So in a sense, all of information
theory derives from Leibniz, for he was the first to emphasize the creative
combinatorial potential of the 0 and 1 bit, and how everything can be built
up from this one elemental choice, from these two elemental possibilities. So,
perhaps not entirely seriously, I should propose changing the name of the
unit of information from the bit to the leibniz !
3. The halting probability Ω and information-
theoretic incompleteness
Enough philosophy, let’s do some mathematics! The first step is to pick a
universal binary computer U with the property that for any other binary
computer C there is a binary prefix piC such that
U(piC p) = C(p).
Here p is a binary program for C and the prefix piC tells U how to simulate
C and does not depend on p. In the U that I’ve picked, piC consists of a
description of C written in the high-level non-numerical functional program-
ming language LISP, which is much like a computerized version of set theory,
except that all sets are finite.
Next we define the algorithmic information content (program-size com-
plexity) of a LISP symbolic expression (S-expression) X to be the size in bits
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|p| of the smallest binary program p that makes our chosen U compute X :
H(X) ≡ min
U(p)=X
|p|.
Similarly, the information content or complexity of a formal axiomatic
theory with the infinite set of theorems T is defined to be the size in bits of
the smallest program that makes U generate the infinite set of theorems T ,
which is a set of S-expressions.
H(T ) ≡ min
U(p)=T
|p|.
Think of this as the minimum number of bits required to tell U how to run
through all possible proofs and systematically generate all the consequences
of the fixed set of axioms. H(T ) is the size in bits of the most concise axioms
for T .
Next we define the celebrated halting probability Ω:
Ω ≡
∑
U(p) halts
2−|p|.
A small technical detail: To get this sum to converge it is necessary that
programs for U be “self-delimiting.” I.e., no extension of a valid program is
a valid program, the set of valid programs has to be a prefix-free set of bit
strings.
So Ω is now a specific, well-defined real number between zero and one, and
let’s consider its binary expansion, i.e., its base-two representation. Discard-
ing the initial decimal (or binary) point, that’s an infinite binary sequence
b1b2b3 . . . To eliminate any ambiguity in case Ω should happen to be a dyadic
rational (which it actually isn’t), let’s agree to change 1000. . . to 0111. . . here
if necessary.
Right away we get into trouble. From the fact that knowing the first N
bits of Ω
ΩN ≡ b1b2b3 . . . bN
would enable us to answer the halting problem for every program p for U with
|p| ≤ N , it is easy to see that the bits of Ω are computationally irreducible:
H(ΩN) ≥ N − c.
And from this it follows using a straight-forward program-size argument (see
[3]) that the bits of Ω are also logically irreducible.
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What does this mean? Well, consider a formal axiomatic theory with
theorems T , an infinite set of S-expressions. If we assume that a theorem of
the form “The kth bit of Ω is 0/1” is in T only if it’s true, then T cannot
enable us to determine more than H(T ) + c′ bits of Ω.
So the bits of Ω are irreducible mathematical facts, they are mathematical
facts that contradict Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason by being true
for no reason. They must, to use Kantian terminology, be apprehended
as things in themselves. They cannot be deduced as consequences of any
axioms or principles that are simpler than they are.
(By the way, this also implies that the bits of Ω are statistically random,
e.g., Ω is absolutely Borel normal in every base. I.e., all blocks of digits of
the same size have equal limiting relative frequency, regardless of the radix
chosen for representing Ω.)
Furthermore, in my 1987 Cambridge University Press monograph [15]
I celebrate the fact that the bits of Ω can be encoded via a diophantine
equation. There I exhibit an exponential diophantine equation L(k,x) =
R(k,x) with parameter k and about twenty-thousand unknowns x that has
infinitely many solutions iff the kth bit of Ω is a 1. And recently Ord and
Kieu [16] have shown that this can also be accomplished using the even/odd
parity of the number of solutions, rather than its finite/infinite cardinality.
So Ω’s irreducibility also infects elementary number theory!
These rather brutal incompleteness results show how badly mistaken
Hilbert was to assume that a fixed formal axiomatic theory could encompass
all of mathematics. And if you have to extend the foundations of math-
ematics by constantly adding new axioms, new concepts and fundamental
principles, then mathematics becomes much more tentative and begins to
look much more like an empirical science. At least I think so, and you can
even find quotes by Go¨del that I think point in the same direction.
These ideas are of course controversial; see for example a highly critical
review of two of my books in the AMS Notices [17]. I discuss the hostile
reaction of the logic community to my ideas in more detail in an interview
with performance artist Marina Abramovic [18]. Here, however, I prefer
to tell why I think that the world is actually moving rather quickly in my
direction. In fact, I believe that my ideas are now part of an unstoppable
tidal wave of change spreading across the sciences!
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4. The digital philosophy paradigm shift
As I have argued in the second half of my 2002 paper in the EATCS Bulletin
[19], what we are witnessing now is a dramatic convergence of mathematics
with theoretical computer science and with theoretical physics. The partic-
ipants in this paradigm shift believe that information and computation are
fundamental concepts in all three of these domains, and that what physical
systems actually do is computation, i.e., information processing. In other
words, as is asked on the cover of a recent issue of La Recherche with an
article [20] about this, “Is God a Computer?”
But that is not quite right. Rather, we should ask, “Is God a Program-
mer?” The intellectual legacy of the West, and in this connection let me recall
Pythagoras, Plato, Galileo and James Jeans, states that “Everything is num-
ber; God is a mathematician.” We are now beginning to believe something
slightly different, a refinement of the original Pythagorean credo: “Every-
thing is software; God is a computer programmer.” Or perhaps I should say:
“All is algorithm!” Just as DNA programs living beings, God programs the
universe.
In the digital philosophy movement I would definitely include: the ex-
tremely active field of quantum information and quantum computation [21],
Wolfram’s work [22] on A New Kind of Science, Fredkin’s work on reversible
cellular automata and his website at http://digitalphilosophy.org (the
pregnant phrase “digital philosophy” is due to Fredkin), the Bekenstein-
t’Hooft “holographic principle” [23], and AIT. Ideas from theoretical physics
and theoretical computer science are definitely leaking across the traditional
boundaries between these two fields. And this holds for AIT too, because its
two central concepts are versions of randomness and of entropy, which are
ideas that I took with me from physics and into mathematical logic.
Wolfram’s work is particularly relevant to our discussion of the nature
of mathematics, because he believes that most simple systems are either
trivial or equivalent to a universal computer, and therefore that mathematical
questions are either trivial or can never be solved, except, so to speak, for a
set of measure zero. This he calls his principle of computational equivalence,
and it leads him to take the incompleteness phenomenon much more seriously
than most mathematicians do. In line with his thesis, his book presents a
great deal of computational evidence, but not many proofs.
Another important issue studied in Wolfram’s book [22] is the question
of whether, to use Leibnizian terminology, mathematics is necessary or is
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contingent. I.e., would intelligent creatures on another planet necessarily
discover the same concepts that we have, or might they develop a perfectly
viable mathematics that we would have a great deal of trouble in recognizing
as such? Wolfram gives a number of examples that suggest that the latter is
in fact the case.
I should also mention some recent books on the quasi-empirical view of
mathematics [24] and on experimental mathematics [25, 26], as well as Dou-
glas Robertson’s two volumes [27, 28] on information as a key historical and
cultural parameter and motor of social change, and John Maynard Smith’s
related books on biology [29, 30].
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry [29, 30] measure biological evolutionary
progress in terms of abrupt improvements in the way information is repre-
sented and transmitted inside living organisms. Robertson sees social evolu-
tion as driven by the same motor. According to Robertson [27, 28], spoken
language defines the human, writing creates civilization, the printing press
provoked the Renaissance, and the Internet is weaving a new World-Wide
Web. These are abrupt improvements in the way human society is able
to store and transmit information. And they result in abrupt increases in
cultural complexity, in abrupt increases in social intelligence, as it were.
(And for the latest results on Ω, see Calude [31].)
5. Digital philosophy is Leibnizian; Leibniz’s
legacy
None of us who made this paradigm shift happen were students of Leibniz,
but he anticipated us all. As I hinted in a letter to La Recherche, in a sense
all of Wolfram’s thousand-page book is the development of one sentence in
Leibniz:
“Dieu a choisi celuy qui est. . . le plus simple en hypothe-
ses et le plus riche en phenomenes”
[God has chosen that which is the most simple in hypotheses and the
most rich in phenomena]
This presages Wolfram’s basic insight that simple programs can have very
complicated-looking output.
And all of my work may be regarded as the development of another
sentence in Leibniz:
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“Mais quand une regle est fort compose´e, ce qui luy est
conforme, passe pour irre´gulier”
[But when a rule is extremely complex, that which conforms to it
passes for random]
Here I see the germ of my definition of algorithmic randomness and irre-
ducibility.
Newtonian physics is now receding into the dark, distant intellectual past.
It’s not just that it has been superseded by quantum physics. No, it’s much
deeper than that. In our new interest in complex systems, the concepts
of energy and matter take second place to the concepts of information and
computation. And the continuum mathematics of Newtonian physics now
takes second place to the combinatorial mathematics of complex systems.
As E. T. Bell stated so forcefully [32], Newton made one big contribution
to math, involving the continuum, but Leibniz made two: his work on the
continuum and his work on discrete combinatorics (which Leibniz named).
Newton obliterated Leibniz and stole from him both his royal patron and the
credit for the calculus. Newton was buried with full honors at Westminster
Abbey, while a forgotten Leibniz was accompanied to his grave by only his
secretary. But, as E. T. Bell stated a half a century ago [32], with every
passing year, the shadow cast by Leibniz gets larger and larger.
How right Bell was! The digital philosophy paradigm is a direct intellec-
tual descendent of Leibniz, it is part of the Leibnizian legacy. The human
race has finally caught up with this part of Leibniz’s thinking. Are there,
Wolfram and I wonder, more treasures there that we have not yet been able
to decipher and appreciate?
6. Acknowledgment; Coda on the continuum
and the Kabbalah
The author wishes to thank Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin for sharing with him
her understanding and appreciation of Leibniz, during innumerable lengthy
conversations. In her opinion, however, this essay does Leibniz an injustice
by completely ignoring his deep interest in the “labyrinth of the continuum,”
which is her specialty.
Let me address her concern. According to Leibniz, the integers are hu-
man, the discrete is at the level of Man. But the continuum transcends
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Man and brings us closer to God. Indeed, Ω is transcendent, and may be
regarded as the concentrated essence of mathematical creativity. In a note
on the Kabbalah, which regards Man as perfectable and evolving towards
God, Leibniz [33, pp. 112–115] observes that with time we shall know all
interesting theorems with proofs of up to any given fixed size, and this can
be used to measure human progress.
If the axioms and rules of inference are fixed, then this kind of progress can
be achieved mechanically by brute force, which is not very interesting. The
interesting case is allowing new axioms and concepts. So I would propose
instead that human progress—purely intellectual, not moral progress—be
measured by the number of bits of Ω that we have been able to determine
up to any given time.
Let me end with Leibniz’s remarks about the effects of this kind of
progress [33, pp. 115]:
If this happens, it must follow that those minds which are not
yet sufficiently capable will become more capable so that they
can comprehend and invent such great theorems, which are nec-
essary to understand nature more deeply and to reduce physical
truths to mathematics, for example, to understand the mechani-
cal functioning of animals, to forsee certain future contingencies
with a certain degree of accuracy, and to do certain wonderful
things in nature, which are now beyond our capacity. . .
Every mind has a horizon in respect to its present intellectual
capacity but not in respect to its future intellectual capacity.
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